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ABSTRACT. The scope and nature of conspiracy liability under international
criminal law have long provoked controversy among scholars and practitioners alike.
The questions whether this notion is a crime, or a form of criminal participation, or
both, and what is its relation to the theory of joint criminal enterprise, have been at
the core of these debates. The UN ad hoc Tribunals have routinely held that con-
spiracy is strictly an inchoate crime and is, therefore, fundamentally diﬀerent from
joint criminal enterprise responsibility. This line of reasoning, however, has been
challenged by many in the commentariat who continue to argue that the interna-
tional legislative origins of conspiracy in post-World War II documents and
jurisprudence also deﬁned this notion as a mode of liability. Far from being merely
theoretical, this debate has been fuelled by a very practical consideration: the
argument that since the concept of conspiracy has been shunned in international
criminal law ever since the Nuremberg process, the joint criminal enterprise theory
should also be repudiated. This article will thoroughly review the Nuremberg-era law
on conspiracy in order to evaluate the conﬂicting interpretations of its legal nature. It
will demonstrate that although this notion was originally construed to have a
bifurcated function, it was then gradually reﬁned and distinguished already back in
those days from the underlying principles of the joint criminal enterprise theory.
I INTRODUCTION
Conspiracy is a legal construct which has been widely eschewed in
contemporary international criminal law. It was excluded in toto from
the ICC Rome Statute1 and was adopted by the UN ad hoc Tri-
bunals’ strictly as an inchoate crime and solely in relation to geno-
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cide.2 One would expect that in this limited context there would be
little, if any, debate on the meaning and nature of this concept. In-
stead, it has often drawn the attention of scholars and practitioners,
largely on account of allegations that it is analogous to the theory of
joint criminal enterprise (JCE’).3 An argument that has been recur-
rently raised is that if the two notions are, indeed, conceptually the
same, then JCE should be expunged from international criminal law
just as conspiracy has been. The exact relationship between these
doctrines remains contested, seeing that this issue was also brought
up in some of the latest ICTY judgments.4 Indeed, as recently as
January 2014, the ICTY Ðord-evic´ Appeals Chamber was seized with
this particular matter after the Defence submitted in its appeal brief
that, with one particular exception, the notion of conspiracy was
rejected in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (IMT’) and that, therefore, the ICTY/R should also
cease applying the JCE doctrine:
In other words, when rejecting conspiracy as applied to crimes against humanity and
war crimes, the IMT rejected common plan liability as well. Therefore, the IMT
explicitly declined to rely on JCE or anything similar in order to convict accused of
war crimes or crimes against humanity. It eschewed imposing such sweeping liabil-
ity… There is, therefore, nothing in the London Charter or IMT Judgement that
supports JCE as applied by the Appeals Chamber. The most authoritative WWII
tribunal declined to utilise JCE or anything similar.5
2 Article 4(3)(b) ICTY Statute and Article 2(3)(b) ICTR Statute establish solely
the crime of ‘‘conspiracy to commit genocide’’ and do not recognize any other use of
this notion. Fletcher thus viewed these provisions as ‘‘the afterglow of a dying
concept’’. G. Fletcher, Amicus Curiae Brief of Specialists in Conspiracy and Inter-
national Law in Support of Petitioner [Conspiracy – Not a Triable Oﬀense], at 12,
ﬁled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
3 See e.g. K. Ambos (n 1 above), 173; H. Van Der Wilt, Joint Criminal Enterprise
and Functional Perpetration’, in: H. Van Der Wilt and A. Nollkaemper (eds.),
System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 164; G. Fletcher and J. Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of
Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’, (2005) 3(3) Journal of International Criminal
Justice 539, 544, 548–549; A. Danner and J. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of Interna-
tional Criminal Law’, (2005) 93(1) California Law Review 75, 110.
4 Prosecutor v. Ðord-evic´, (Appeal Judgment) IT-05-87/1-A (27 January 2014),
paras. 28, 32–34; Prosecutor v. Prlic´ et al., (Trial Judgment, Separate and Partially
Dissenting Opinion of Presiding Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti) IT-04-74-T (29 May
2013), at 100 et seq.
5 Prosecutor v Ðord-evic´, (Vlastimir Ðord-evic´ Appeal Brief) IT-05-87/1-A (15
August 2011), paras. 41, 43, 45; Prosecutor v. Ðord-evic´ (n 4 above), paras. 32–34.
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The present article submits that the continuing debates on this topic
are largely caused by the ambiguous manner in which conspiracy was
construed in World War II-era documents and jurisprudence. In
particular, it is still questionable whether this construct was deﬁned
and applied strictly as an independent crime, and as such is inherently
diﬀerent from JCE, which is a mode of liability, or whether it was
also used to impute responsibility for substantive crimes. Moreover,
if the latter is true, does this mean that a sign of equality could be put
between the two notions and, respectively, that the asserted IMT’s
rejection of such a sweeping use of conspiracy constitutes a tacit
rejection of the present-day JCE theory? In order to address these
questions, a review of the origin and evolution of the law on con-
spiracy in the Nuremberg-era context will be oﬀered. This in turn will
help to meaningfully compare it to the JCE doctrine and test the
contention that they are akin to each other and, therefore, ought to
share the same fate. The article will start by brieﬂy sketching out the
conﬂicting arguments that have been raised in legal practice and
scholarship on this particular issue, thus explaining the nature of the
problem at hand. Afterwards, the main part of the research will trace
and analyse the conspiracy notion from the point of its ﬁrst formu-
lation in the ﬁeld of international criminal law, through the heated
debates on its legal meaning during the drafting of the London
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT Charter’), to its
application/rejection in the IMT Judgment and the subsequent Nazi
trials. This systematic review will ultimately serve to: (i) explain the
opposing views that continue to be expressed on the nature and scope
of conspiracy liability; (ii) assess the merits of either proposition; and
(iii) conclude on the questioned relationship between conspiracy and
JCE liability.
II THE CONTROVERSY OVER JCE AND CONSPIRACY
It is nowadays well known that JCE is a mode of liability that was
ﬁrst introduced in the ﬁeld of modern international criminal law by
the ICTY Tadic´ Appeals Chamber.6 It has been applied in cases
where a crime is committed by a group of individuals who coordinate
eﬀorts in pursuance of a common criminal plan. In such scenarios,
the theory is used to reciprocally attribute the acts of each participant
6 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, (Appeal Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999), paras. 185–
225.
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in the plan to the other JCE members, so that at the end they could
all be held equally liable for the committed crime(s) of the enterprise
(even though only one or some of the JCE members physically
committed the said crimes). The international tribunals have con-
ﬁrmed that the notion has three variants, generally labelled as the
basic’ (JCE I), the systemic’ (JCE II) and the extended’ (JCE III)
form.7 In a nutshell, to convict an accused under any of them, three
objective requirements have to be met: (i) the existence of a plurality
of individuals; (ii) a common plan that is aimed at or involves the
commission of crimes; and (iii) the accused’s contribution to the
criminal plan.8 It is the requisite mens rea that distinguishes the three
categories of JCE. JCE I liability requires that the accused shares the
common intent to commit the concerted crime.9 For JCE II liability –
which applies when the common plan is institutionalized’ (viz. it
takes place in a system of ill-treatment, such as a concentration camp)
– it must be established that the accused had knowledge of the said
system and intended to further its criminal purpose.10 Finally, JCE
III liability allows imputing to the accused responsibility for crimes
that were committed outside the original plan but were nevertheless a
natural and foreseeable consequence of its execution.11 This requires
7 Ibid., paras. 195–207; Prosecutor v. Stakic´, (Appeal Judgment) IT-97-24-A (22
March 2006), para. 65; Prosecutor v. Ðord-evic´, (Trial Judgment) IT-05-87/1-T (23
February 2011), paras. 1864–1865; Prosecutor v. Simba, (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-
01-76-A (27 November 2007), paras. 76–80; Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, (Appeals
Chamber) STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis (16 February 2011), paras. 237–239.
8 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (n 6 above), para. 227; Prosecutor v. Brd-anin, (Appeal
Judgment) IT-99-36-A (3 April 2007), para. 430; Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and
Kanu, (Appeal Judgment) SCSL-2004-16-A (22 February 2008), para. 75; Prosecutor
v. Munyakazi, (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-97-36A-A (28 September 2011), para. 160;
Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, (Trial Judgment) 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/
TC (26 July 2010), para. 508.
9 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (n 6 above), para. 228; Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka et al., (Appeal
Judgment) IT-98-30/1-A (28 February 2005), para. 82; Prosecutor v. Stanisˇic´ &
Simatovic´, (Trial Judgment) IT-03-69-T (30 May 2013), para. 1255; Prosecutor v.
Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, (Appeal Judgment) SCSL-04-15-A (26 October 2009), para.
474; Prosecutor v. Duch (n 8 above), para. 509.
10 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (n 6 above), para. 228; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, (Appeal
Judgment) IT-97-25-A (17 September 2003), para. 89; Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka et al. (n 9
above), para. 82; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (n 9 above), para. 474.
11 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (n 6 above), para. 204; Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka et al. (n 8
above), para. 83; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (n 9 above), paras. 474–475;
Prosecutor v. Duch (n 8 above), para. 509.
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evidence that the incidental crime was a foreseeable consequence of
the execution of the original plan and the accused willingly took that
risk by continuing his participation in the JCE.12 This mens rea
standard has often been referred to as dolus eventualis or advertent
recklessness.13 For the purposes of this research, it bears noting that
JCE responsibility is not explicitly provided in the statutes of any of
the international ad hoc tribunals, but has been applied on the basis
of its purported status as a rule of customary international criminal
law: i.e. its adoption in Nuremberg-era documents and jurisprudence.
For this reason, the latter body of law has often been reviewed when
raising challenges to this mode of liability.
It was several years after the Tadic´ Appeal Judgment that parallels
between the theory of joint criminal enterprise and the conspiracy
notion were ﬁrst brought up in a pronounced attempt to undermine
JCE’s conceptual soundness and the legal basis for its application in
international criminal law. In the ICTY Ojdanic´ case, the Defence
submitted that JCE is in fact a euphemism for conspiracy,’14 and
argued that since the latter concept was repudiated from the ICTY
Statute, so should the former be excluded from criminal proceedings
before the Tribunal.15 It was pointed out that the ICTY Statute drew
from the experience at Nuremberg’ and that the IMT rejected the use
of conspiracy for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.16 The Appeals Chamber rejected the Defence’s arguments
12 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (n 6 above), para. 228; Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka et al. (n 9
above), para. 83; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (n 9 above), para. 475;
Prosecutor v. Duch (n 8 above), para. 509; STL Interlocutory Decision (n 7 above),
para. 239.
13 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´ et al., (Trial Judgment Vol.1) IT-05-87-T (26 February
2009), para. 96; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (n 9 above), para. 475; STL
Interlocutory Decision (n 7 above), para. 248.
14 Prosecutor v. Sˇainovic´ and Ojdanic´ (General Dragoljub Ojdanic´’s Preliminary
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-PT
(29 November 2002), para. 6. The Defence further argued that conspiracy is ‘‘pre-
cisely the basis of liability for joint criminal enterprise’’. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´
et al., (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic´’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint
Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003), para. 14.
15 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´ et al., (General Ojdanic´’s Appeal from Denial of
Preliminary Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise)
IT-99-37-AR72 (28 February 2003), para. 20; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´ et al. (Motion
Challenging Jurisdiction) (n 14 above), para. 23.
16 Prosecutor v. Ojdanic´ (Appeal) (n 15 above), paras. 24–35.
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after stressing that JCE and conspiracy are materially distinct con-
cepts:
Whilst conspiracy requires a showing that several individuals agreed to commit a
certain crime or set of crimes, a joint criminal enterprise requires, in addition to such
a showing, that the parties to that agreement took action in furtherance of that
agreement. In other words, while mere agreement is suﬃcient in the case of con-
spiracy, the liability of a member of a joint criminal enterprise will depend on the
commission of criminal acts in furtherance of that enterprise. Thus, even if it were
conceded that conspiracy was excluded from the realm of the Tribunal’s Statute, that
would have no impact on the presence of joint criminal enterprise as a form of
commission’ pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute.17
Conspiracy was deﬁned as a substantive crime of which the accused
could be found guilty, while JCE was clearly construed as a mode of
liability that allows holding the accused responsible for crimes
resulting from the execution of a common criminal plan. The judges
concluded, therefore, that even if conspiracy was, indeed, eschewed
from the ICTY Statute, this could have no impact on the application
of the JCE doctrine in the Tribunal’s criminal proceedings.18
The Ojdanic´ Appeals Chamber’s reasoning on this point has been
cited with approval in academia19 and has also been aﬃrmed in the
subsequent case law of the ICTR, SCSL and STL.20 Yet the matter
was never put to rest, considering that at present there remain many
17 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´ et al. (Decision on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction)
(n 14 above), para. 23.
18 Ibid.
19 A. Cassese, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013), 163; H. Ola´solo, The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and
Military Leaders as Principals to International Crimes (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2009), 34; C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International
Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 188, 191–193; A. Sanders,
New Frontiers in the ATS: Conspiracy and Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability after
Sosa’, (2010) 28(2) Berkley Journal of International Law 619, 631–632.
20 The STL Appeals Chamber conﬁrmed that ‘‘the notions of conspiracy… and
joint criminal enterprise are distinct: the former is a substantive crime, the latter is a
mode of criminal responsibility.’’ See STL Interlocutory Decision (n 7 above), para.
203. A nearly identical ﬁnding was made by the SCSL Appeals Chamber when it held
that ‘‘conspiracy and JCE are legally distinct concepts. Most obviously, conspiracy is
an inchoate oﬀence whereas JCE is a mode of liability.’’ Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon
and Gbao (n 8 above), para. 397. For ICTR case law on this matter, see e.g.
Prosecutor v. Mpambara, (Trial Judgment) ICTR-01-65-T (11 September 2006),
para. 13; Gatete v. the Prosecutor, (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-00-61-A (9 October
2012), para. 263.
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scholars who argue that JCE is akin to conspiracy responsibility.21
This contention even received support from within the UN ad hoc
Tribunals when Judge Schomburg wrote in a separate opinion to the
ICTY Martic´ Appeals Judgment that:
While the Appeals Chamber has in the past explicitly stated that criminal liability
pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise is not liability for mere membership or for
conspiring to commit crimes,’ the constant expansion of the concept of JCE in the
jurisprudence of the International Tribunal suggests the contrary.22
Thus, while one camp in this debate has ﬁrmly rejected the argument
that JCE can be equated to conspiracy, the other has persistently
argued the opposite. This discord can be explained with the diﬀerent
views that scholars and practitioners hold regarding the nature of the
latter concept. In particular, while the international tribunals have
consistently regarded it as an independent crime, critics have dis-
missed this conclusion and contended that a close inspection of this
notion reveals that it has also been deﬁned as a mode of liability, both
in Nuremberg-era law and in US national criminal law.23 In their
21 See e.g. K. Ambos (n 1 above), 173; A. Chouliaras, Discourses on International
Criminality’, in: A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal
Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010), 84; H. Van Der
Wilt, System Criminality (n 3 above), 164; M. C. Bassiouni, Introduction to Inter-
national Criminal Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, 2d edn., 2013), 313; J.
Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes’, (2011) 11(2) Chicago
Journal of International Law 693, 695, 702–703; N. Boister, The Application of
Collective and Comprehensive Criminal Responsibility for Aggression at the Tokyo
International Military Tribunal: The Measure of the Crime of Aggression?’, (2010)
8(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 425, 436–437; G. Fletcher and J. Ohlin
(n 3 above), 544, 548–549; A. Danner and J. Martinez (n 3 above), 110.
22 Prosecutor v. Martic´, (Appeal Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg
on the Individual Criminal Responsibility of Milan Martic´) IT-95-11-A (8 October
2008), para. 5. The latest example of this discourse could be seen in the ICTY Prlic´
et al. Trial Judgment where Judge Antonetti, writing in a separate opinion, pointed
out that JCE is seen by many as an outgrowth of the conspiracy notion and went on
to examine the origins and scope of these constructs. Prosecutor v. Prlic´ et al., (Judge
Antonetti Separate Opinion) (n 4 above), 100 et seq.
23 Danner and Martinez, for instance, have argued that ‘‘international judges fail
to acknowledge that conspiracy is not only a substantive crime but also constitutes a
liability theory in its own right.’’ A. Danner and J. Martinez (n 3 above), 119.
Similarly, Ohlin has argued that there is ‘‘substantial historical support for the idea
that common purpose liability [i.e. JCE] and conspiracy liability are one and the
same’’. J. Ohlin (n 21 above), 702–703. See also e.g. H. Van Der Wilt, System
Criminality (n 3 above), 164; H. Van Der Wilt, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Possi-
bilities and Limitations’, (2007) 5(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 91, 96.
A JANUS-FACED CONCEPT 425
view, the JCE theory is merely a new label for precisely this formu-
lation of conspiracy. The argument then goes that the IMT’s rejection
of the latter construct materially detracts from the conclusion that
JCE has a legal basis in customary international law. Therefore, it is
important to ﬁnd out what exactly was the legal framework of con-
spiracy under Nuremberg-era law, which aspects of it were rejected
by the IMT and how does that aﬀect the JCE doctrine.
III THE NUREMBERG LAW ON CONSPIRACY
Towards the end of World War II, the Governments of France, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America
(the Allies’) struggled to agree on how to best deal with the Nazi
criminals after the war. The fear that the abysmal scale of the Nazi
crimes and the sheer number of perpetrators will cast an insur-
mountable obstacle to prosecution by traditional means was shared
by many at the time.24 It was evident that if mass impunity or
extrajudicial executions were to be avoided in favour of judicial ac-
tion, a prosecutorial strategy had to be developed that would account
for the practical diﬃculties of trying nationwide, systemic war crim-
inality. It is in this context that the notion of conspiracy was ﬁrst
construed as a legal tool for the prosecution of international crimes.
3.1 Introducing Conspiracy: Bernays’ Prosecutorial Strategy
The ﬁrst person to devise a concrete plan on how to prosecute the
major Nazi war criminals and their subordinates was a lawyer called
Murray Bernays, who worked at the then U.S. Department of War.
In a memorandum to his superiors, dated 15 September 1944, he
proposed a two-winged prosecutorial strategy which would eventu-
ally leave a visible mark on the IMT Charter.25 He recognized the
practical diﬃculties of applying traditional legal notions to try the
Nazis and thus suggested the adoption of two concepts that were
unknown to international law at the time: conspiracy and member-
ship in a criminal organization.26 He argued that the Allies’ ﬁrst step
24 B. F. Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record,
1944–1945 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 41.
25 Subject: Trial of European War Criminals (by Colonel Murray C. Bernays, G-1),
15 September 1944, re-printed in ibid., 33–37.
26 Ibid., 35–36. The membership in a criminal organization’ concept falls outside
the scope of this paper and, for reasons of brevity, will not be addressed here.
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in a judicial process should be to start an international mega-trial
against the most nefarious organizations of the Third Reich and their
respective leaders:
9. The following is therefore recommended for consideration:
a. The Nazi Government and its Party and State agencies, including the SA, SS,
and Gestapo, should be charged before an appropriately constituted interna-
tional court with conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism, and the destruction of
peaceful populations in violation of the laws of war.
b. For the purposes of trial. the prosecuting Nations should bring to the bar only
such individual defendants, considered to be representative of the defendant
organizations, as they elect.27
The idea was thus to charge both the Nazi leaders and the organi-
zations which they headed with conspiracy to commit murder, ter-
rorism and the destruction of peaceful populations’. Bernays
explained that for an adjudication of guilt, the court would require
no proof that the individuals aﬀected participated in any overt act
other than membership in the conspiracy’.28 In other words, by
merely agreeing to the Hitlerite conspiracy, one became guilty of it.
The scope of this concept was then further expanded in paragraph
10b, which held that once the conspiracy is established, each act of
every member thereof during its continuance and in furtherance of its
purposes would be imputable to all other members thereof’.29 As
explained in detail below, this structure altered the classical meaning
of conspiracy as an inchoate crime and turned it into an expansive
mode of liability: one that the prosecution could use to link every
major Nazi war criminal to virtually the entire spectre of crimes
committed by the regime during the war. In a nutshell, by solely
proving the existence of an agreement among the accused leaders to
commit murder, terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful popula-
tions,’ each one of them could be convicted not only of conspiracy as
an anticipatory crime, but also of all the substantive crimes that
subsequently resulted from it. Thus, the law did not require proof
that the accused himself participated, through personal acts or
omissions, in the furtherance of the said conspiracy in order to hold
him liable for its substantive crimes: it suﬃced to prove that he agreed
to them with the other co-conspirators. This approach was designed
27 Ibid., 36 (emphasis added).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 37.
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to resolve the evidentiary diﬃculties that were expected to occur if the
Prosecution had to personally link each accused at the apex of the
Nazi military and state apparatus to all the crimes committed in
distant corners of Europe.
3.2 Reviewing Bernays’ Conspiracy: The US Inter-Departmental
Debates
Bernays’ plan was innovative and oﬀered compelling solutions to the
practical impossibilities of prosecuting the Axis war criminals, which
is why it managed to gain considerable support from other senior US
oﬃcials.30 However, its doctrinal foundations suﬀered from legal
defects which were so fundamental that they immediately attracted
criticism. The highlights of the ensuing US inter-departmental de-
bates on this plan are explored here in order to explain the meaning
and the incoherencies of the concepts that Bernays construed.
Being a US lawyer, it was only natural that Bernays drew heavily
from Anglo-American law when drafting his proposal on the Nazi
prosecutorial strategy. Conspiracy, in particular, is a common law
concept which was largely unknown in European legal culture.31 At
the time, courts had construed it strictly as an inchoate crime which is
completed when two or more persons form an agreement to engage in
unlawful conduct.32 Its actus reus is thus the very act of agreeing with
other individuals to commit a crime and its mens rea, the intent to
30 Ibid., 52–53.
31 S. Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organization’, in: G. Ginsburgs and V.
Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Marti-
nus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, 1990), 218; G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 219; E. Van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Respon-
sibility in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 179; A. Danner
and J. Martinez (n 3 above), 115.
32 Mulcahy v. R, (1868) LR 3 HL 306, 317; United States v. Hirsch, 100 U.S. 33
(1879), 34; Pettibone v. United States, 13 S.Ct. 542 (1893), 545; United States v.
Falcone, 61 S.Ct. 204 (1940), 207. See also A. J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Con-
spiracy’, (1941) 89 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 624, 628; H. Wechsler
et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American
Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy’, (1961) 61(6) Columbia Law
Review 957, 958; G. Fletcher (n 31 above), 218; T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the
Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York: Knopf, 1992), 36; D. Ormerod
et al., Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13th edn.,
2011), 423–424.
LACHEZAR YANEV428
agree and to carry out the said substantive crime.33 Accordingly, for
an adjudication on conspiracy guilt, it is wholly immaterial whether
the agreement was ultimately executed, i.e. whether the projected
crime was committed or not.34 If it was, then the responsibility of the
conspirator for this crime is independent from the conspiracy charge
and is determined using the principles of complicity. Following this
rationale, an accused may be found guilty both of conspiracy to
commit murder and of, for instance, aiding and abetting murder;
however, it could also happen that the judges convict him of the
conspiracy charge but acquit him of the substantive crime.35
Bernays’ conspiracy was a notably diﬀerent kind of creature, a
controversial amalgam of conspiracy proper and accomplice liability
that several years later was introduced in US national criminal law
and became widely known as the Pinkerton doctrine/conspiracy’.36
33 A. J. Harno (n 32 above), 628, 631 et seq; A. Cassese, International Criminal
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d edn., 2008), 227; D. Ormerod et al. (n 32
above), 426; As part of the actus reus element, some jurisdictions also require an
‘‘overt act in furtherance of the criminal agreement,’’ i.e. an act, no matter how
insigniﬁcant, carried out in furtherance of the conspiracy by one of the co-conspir-
ators. See P. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy’, (1973) 61(5) Cali-
fornia Law Review 1137, 1142–1143; H. Wechsler et al. (n 32 above), 1003. It has
been noted, however, that ‘‘overt acts can be entirely innocent ones and are therefore
not diﬃcult to make out. Many [US] state and federal statutes, and the common law
version of conspiracy, do not even require proof of an over act’’. D. Luban et al.,
International and Transnational Criminal Law (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2010),
879.
34 As Ormerod explains, ‘‘[o]nce the parties have agreed [to commit a crime], the
conspiracy is complete, even if they take no further action because, for example, they
are arrested’’. The conclusion of the agreement marks the commission of the oﬀence,
and if one of the parties immediately after that repents and withdraws from the plan,
he is still guilty of conspiracy – a feature which Ormerod calls ‘‘the crucial distinction
between inchoate oﬀending and liability as a secondary party’’. See D. Ormerod
et al., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 12th edn.,
2008), 400, 402.
35 A. Cassese (n 33 above), 227; A. Cassese, On the Use of Criminal Law Notions
in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide’, (2007) 5(4) Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice 875, 880; H. Wechsler et al. (n 32 above), 960; P. Johnson (n
33 above), 1150–1151; L. Schleicher and D. Stoldt, Federal Criminal Conspiracy’,
(1993) 30(3) American Criminal Law Review 685, 685–686.
36 In June 1946, almost two years after Bernays wrote his memorandum where he
formulated his expansive views on conspiracy liability, the US Supreme Court
adopted this approach in the case of Pinkerton v. United States. Walter and Daniel
Pinkerton were two brothers indicted with the crime of conspiracy and with ten
substantive crimes which resulted from that conspiracy. The judges recognized that
‘‘[t]here is… no evidence to show that Daniel participated directly in the commission
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Pursuant to it, a Nazi leader who agreed to the Hitlerite plan, without
taking any further steps to participate in its realization, could be found
guilty of: (i) the crime of conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism,
and the destruction of peaceful populations; and (ii) all the underlying
crimes that followed from this conspiracy and could be attributed to
at least one of its other members.37 In other words, the only inquiry
that had to be made to impute liability for the substantive oﬀences of
the conspiracy was whether the accused was a co-conspirator: i.e. it
was unnecessary to ask any questions regarding the conduct of the
accused in relation to these crimes. This aspect of Bernays’ conspiracy
notion was particularly troubling because it sought to impute
Footnote 36 continued
of the substantive oﬀenses… although there was evidence to show that these sub-
stantive oﬀenses were in fact committed by Walter in furtherance of the unlawful
agreement or conspiracy existing between the brothers’’. The majority decided that
this was a suﬃcient basis to ﬁnd Daniel guilty not only of conspiracy but also of the
substantive crimes committed by his brother. Justice Rutledge wrote a strong dis-
senting opinion in which he criticized this reasoning and even questioned its con-
stitutionality. He restated that there was no proof ‘‘to establish that Daniel
participated in [the substantive crimes], aided and abetted Walter in committing
them, or knew that he had done so. Daniel in fact was in the penitentiary, under
sentence for other crimes, when some of Walter’s crimes were done’’. The only
evidence against Daniel was that he had earlier formed an agreement to commit a
crime with his brother, leading Justice Rutledge to observe that ‘‘because of that
agreement without more on his part Daniel became criminally responsible as a
principal for everything Walter did thereafter in the nature of a criminal oﬀense of
the general sort the agreement contemplated’’. This, in Justice Rutledge view, was an
unacceptable expansion of the traditional limits of the conspiracy doctrine, and he
dreaded ‘‘[t]he looseness with which the charge may be proved, the almost unlimited
scope of vicarious responsibility for others’ acts which follows once agreement is
shown’’. In his dissent, Justice Rutledge was also joined by Justice Frankfurter. See,
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), 645, 648, 650, 651. The Pinkerton
doctrine proved to be extremely controversial and the inﬂuential US Model Penal
Code, which has been cited with approval by the majority of US states rejecting the
Pinkerton rule, criticised it by stating that the ‘‘law would lose all sense of just
proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each [co-conspirator] were held
accountable for thousands of additional oﬀenses of which he was completely una-
ware and which he did not inﬂuence at all’’. American Law Institute, Model Penal
Code and Commentaries (Oﬃcial Draft and Revised Commentaries): With Text of
Model Penal Code as Adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute at Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute,
1985), 307. It should also be noted that Pinkerton liability has not been accepted in
any other common law jurisdictions. See G. Singer and J. Q. La Fond, Criminal Law:
Examples & Explanations (Austin: Wolters Kluwer/Aspen Publishers, 4edn., 2007),
328–329; D. Luban et al. (n 33 above), 880.
37 See text, notes 27–29 above. S. Pomorski (n 31 above), 216.
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accomplice liability without upholding the basic requirements for
doing so: viz. that the accused, through a positive act or omission,
assists (participates) in the actual perpetration of the projected
crime.38 The act of merely agreeing to the execution of a criminal plan
does not satisfy this requirement. Among the ﬁrst ones to notice this
legal anomaly in Bernays’ plan and criticise it was Herbert Wechsler,
the US Assistant Attorney General at the time. He addressed this
very issue in a memorandum which he sent to his superior, Francis
Biddle: the Attorney General who less than a year later was ap-
pointed as the US judge in the International Military Tribunal.39
Wechsler wrote:
In connection with multiple liability, it should be noted that some confusion may be
engendered by the terminology of [Bernays’ plan]… I should suppose that what is
really to be condemned as criminal is not the inchoate crime of conspiracy but rather
the actual execution of a criminal plan… The point is rather that multiple liability for
a host of completed crimes is established by mutual participation in the execution of the
criminal plan. The Nazi leaders are accomplices in a completed crime according to the
concepts of accessorial liability common, I believe, to all civilized legal systems.40
Wechsler essentially rose two important objections: (i) the Nazi elite
had to be prosecuted not for some grand anticipatory oﬀence (i.e. the
Hitlerite conspiracy) but for the substantive crimes that ensued from
it; and (ii) mere agreement to commit these crimes was not a suﬃcient
legal basis for imputing liability for their commission: it had to be
established that the said ringleaders mutually participated in the
execution of the criminal plan.
It should be noted that Wechsler’s critical analysis on this point
was, if not common… to all civilized legal systems,’ certainly con-
sistent with how civil law jurisdictions interpreted the concepts which
Bernays conﬂated in his memorandum. This was a relevant consid-
eration to take into account when suggesting a novel legal construct
for trying German nationals. August von Knieriem, a lawyer and a
38 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September
2008), paras. 525–548; Prosecutor v. Semanza, (Trial Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15
May 2003), paras. 393, 395; STL Interlocutory Decision (n 6 above), paras. 218–227.
See also, F. Giustiniani, The Responsibility of Accomplices in the Case-Law of the
Ad Hoc Tribunals’, (2009) 20(4) Criminal Law Forum 417, 426–427.
39 Memorandum for the Attorney General (Francis Biddle) from the Assistant
Attorney General (Herbert Wechsler), 29 December 1944, re-printed in Smith (n 24
above), 84–90.
40 Ibid., at 87 (emphasis added).
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defendant in one of the subsequent Nazi trials,41 addressed this same
issue a few years after his acquittal in a manner akin to Wechsler’s
reasoning:
Nor does what is called plot or gangsterism constitute participation. A plot is the
agreement between several persons to commit a speciﬁc crime. Gangsterism is the
association of several persons to commit crimes which are as yet indeﬁnite. If the
crimes planned are actually committed, they are punished according to the general
rules concerning principals or accessories, as the case may be. If six persons have
made a plot to commit a murder and two of them then actually commit the murder
jointly, these two are punished for murder as co-actors. Whether or not the other
four are criminally responsible for the murder depends on whether they are in any
way accessories. The agreement itself does not constitute participation, unless it
actually constitutes an instigation of the as yet undecided actors. Nor do the acts of
some members of a gang result in the punishment of those associates who have not
participated in these acts. Insofar as plotting and gangsterism are considered pun-
ishable at all, they are deﬁned as special crimes. In such cases any member can be
punished for plotting and gangsterism as such, but not for the crimes actually
committed by others.42
Wechsler’s criticism gained momentum and on 22 January 1945 the
Attorney General, joined by the Secretaries of State and War,
signed and sent to President Roosevelt the so-called Yalta memo-
randum’, which preserved Bernays’ vision of a two-staged prose-
cution but replaced his contentious conspiracy concept with what
they called joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise which
included and intended these crimes, or was reasonably calculated to
bring them about’.43 Seeking to avoid prosecution based on novel
and obscure legal constructs, the authors recommended that the
Nazi leaders be tried with the help of this mode of liability, which
was in their view:
ﬁrmly founded upon the rule of liability, common to all penal systems and included
in the general doctrines of the laws of war, that those who participate in the for-
mulation and execution of a criminal plan involving multiple crimes are jointly liable
41 August von Knieriem was one of the 23 defendants in the Farben case. See
Military Tribunal VI, United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al. (‘‘The Farben
Case’’), Case No. 6 (27 August 1947–30 July 1948) in: Trials of War Criminals before
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg,
October 1946–April, 1949, Vols. VII and VIII (1952).
42 A. Knieriem, The Nuremberg Trials (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1959), 204.
43 Memorandum for the President, Subject: Trial and Punishment of Nazi War
Criminals, 22 January 1945, re-printed in B. F. Smith (n 24 above), 120.
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for each of the oﬀenses committed and jointly responsible for the acts of each
other.44
Wechsler’s rebuttal of Bernays’ conspiracy–complicity obviously
struck a chord. In essence, the drafters of the Yalta memorandum
recommended a concept of multiple liability which came very close
to the modern JCE theory. It is more than the analogical labelling,
i.e. joint (participation in a broad) criminal enterprise’: there is an
overlap of the underlying principles. The proposal described a
plurality of individuals who mutually execute a pre-agreed plan.
The plan aims at the commission of crimes: an intent, which unites
all its participants and determines their subsequent cooperation in
carrying out this plan. This is the legal basis on which the acts of
any one of them can be reciprocally imputed to the others in the
group.
The proposal drafted by the US Attorney General and the Sec-
retaries of State and War was far from the last one on this issue.
Nevertheless, its deﬁnition of the principles of liability to be applied
against the Nazi war criminals was reiterated verbatim in the proposal
that the United States ultimately presented to its European Allies at a
conference held in San Francisco in April 1945.45 While this seemed
to put an end to all talks regarding the conspiracy concept, the truth
of the matter turned out to be quite diﬀerent.
44 Ibid. (emphasis added).
45 The San Francisco Conference was convened by the US in an eﬀort to reach a
common understanding that the Nazi arch-criminals should be subjected to a judicial
process, rather than summary executions. The prosecutorial strategy which the US
proposed to the British, Soviet and French delegations eschewed the notion of
conspiracy altogether and instead clariﬁed that the trials against the Nazi war
criminals will be based on ‘‘the rule of liability, common to most penal systems and
included in the general doctrine of the laws of war, that those who participate in the
formulation and execution of a criminal plan involving multiple crimes are jointly
liable for each of the oﬀenses committed and jointly responsible for the acts of each
other’’. It was further explained that the highest ranking German leaders will be
charged before an international military tribunal ‘‘with complicity in the basic
criminal plan,’’ which would require an adjudication on ‘‘the nature and purposes of
the criminal plan, the identity of the groups and organizations guilty of complicity in
it, and the acts committed in its execution’’. Memorandum of Proposals for the
Prosecution and Punishment of Certain War Criminals and Other Oﬀenders, 25–30
April 1945, re-printed in B. F. Smith (n 24 above), 165–166.
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3.3 The Travaux Pre´paratoires of the IMT Charter and Its Con-
spiracy Provisions
Two months after the San Francisco Conference, where the decision
was reached to try the Nazi elite before an international tribunal, the
delegations of the United States of America, France, the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union met again at a conference in London:
this time to discuss and draft the principles of substantive and pro-
cedural criminal law that would be enshrined in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.46 The US delegation
was headed by Robert H. Jackson, the future Chief Prosecutor at the
IMT. Prior to travelling to London, he took charge of a number of
revisions of the US prosecutorial strategy, some of which watered
down the formulation of the principles of liability proposed to the
European Allies at the San Francisco Conference.47 When Jackson
met his colleagues form the Soviet, French and British delegations at
the London Conference, he then told them that the notion of con-
spiracy lay at the heart of our proposal’.48 The record of the ensuing
negotiations could help us understand how the delegates at the
London Conference viewed the notion of conspiracy and, thus,
provide a reliable indicator of the legal meaning that they attributed
to it under what ultimately became Article 6 IMT Charter.
The preparatory works of the IMT Charter clearly show that
Robert Jackson was the main force behind the inclusion of the
conspiracy concept in Article 6, yet they also reveal a somewhat
confusing account on the exact meaning that he had in mind for it.
46 The London Conference took place between 26 June and 9 August 1945 and
transcripts of the negotiations and various legal proposals that were made during the
conference were prepared by the United States Chief Prosecutor at the IMT Trial,
Robert Jackson. See, R. H. Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States
Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945
(Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State, Division of Publications, Oﬃce of Public Aﬀairs,
1949).
47 B. F. Smith (n 24 above), 141. In particular, in a 19 May 1945 redraft of the
American prosecutorial strategy, Jackson and his staﬀ struck out references to
‘‘participation in the commission of crimes and in the execution of criminal plans’’
and instead held that those who participate in the formulation or (deliberately
striking out ‘‘and’’) the execution of a criminal plan, are to be held liable for the acts
of each other. Executive Agreement Relating to the Prosecution of European Axis War
Criminals (Drafts 3 and 4), 19 May 1945, re-printed in B. F. Smith (n 24 above),
205–206.
48 Minutes of Conference Session of July 2, 1945, Document XX, in R. H. Jackson
(n 46 above), 129.
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On the one hand, he explicitly stated its nature as a substantive
crime,49 as did the British delegation, which initially argued that the
chief crime of which it is alleged that the leaders in Germany are
guilty is the common plan or conspiracy to dominate Europe’.50 On
the other hand, however, at times Jackson also spoke of the principle
of conspiracy by which one who joins in a common plan to commit
crime becomes responsible for the acts of any other conspirator in
executing the plan’.51 The latter interpretation seemed to bring back
the conspiracy–complicity concept which, as originally deﬁned in
Bernays’ memorandum, treated the sole act of agreeing to a criminal
design (viz. joining it) as a suﬃcient legal basis to also impute liability
for the substantive crimes committed in pursuance of the said con-
spiracy. However, a more careful study of Jackson’s statements
during this period shows that it is unlikely that he actually sought to
implement Bernays’ views on conspiracy into the Charter of the IMT.
It is well known that during the London negotiations the civil law
allies were determined to exclude any reference to the conspiracy
concept from the IMT Charter. Jackson himself stated several years
after these events that there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of viewpoint
concern[ing] the principles of conspiracy as developed in Anglo-
American law, which are not fully followed nor always well regarded
by Continental jurists’.52 Bradley Smith, who was an eminent histo-
rian and commentator of the Nuremberg process, oﬀered a more
vivid and often quoted narrative of the French and Soviet disap-
proval of the conspiracy concept:
During much of the discussion, the Russians and French seemed unable to grasp all
the implications of the concept; when they ﬁnally did grasp it, they were genuinely
shocked. The French viewed it entirely as a barbarous legal mechanism unworthy of
modern law, while the Soviets seemed to have shaken their head in wonderment – a
reaction, some cynics may believe, prompted by envy. But the main point of the
Soviet attack on conspiracy was that it was too vague and so unfamiliar to the
French and themselves, as well as to the Germans, that it would lead to endless
confusion.53
49 Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945, Document XXXVII, in ibid., 87.
50 Amendments Proposed by the United Kingdom, June 28,1945, Document XIV, in
ibid., 296.
51 R. H. Jackson (n 46 above), at ix (Preface).
52 Ibid., at vii (Preface).
53 B. F. Smith, Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg: The Untold Story of How the
Nazi War Criminals Were Judged (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 51.
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The French reacted by submitting a counter-proposal which left out
the conspiracy concept in its entirety and instead stated that the
Tribunal will have jurisdiction to try individuals who in any capacity
whatsoever, directed the perpetration and conduct of’ international
crimes.54 Professor Gros, who led the French delegation, further
elaborated on this draft by explaining that the Nazi senior oﬃcials
who have planned invasions and atrocities are responsible for all the
atrocities which have been committed in execution of that plan. They
are the instigators of the crimes’.55 It is evident that the French
sought to avoid the ambivalent conspiracy construct in favor of more
traditional modes of liability that stress the accused’s active partici-
pation in the formulation and direction of crimes. They rejected the
idea of imputing crimes to an individual on the mere basis that he had
agreed to their commission and they also did not accept that such an
agreement could in itself be a crime.
The French proposal paved the way for a series of new drafts on
the principles of liability to be included in the IMT Charter. The
British, who at ﬁrst were supportive of the US conspiracy strategy,56
also proposed a text that left out this concept and instead built on the
French draft. In particular, it stated that the future tribunal would
exercise jurisdiction over those individuals who in any capacity
whatever directed or participated in the planning, furtherance, or
conduct of any or all of the following acts, designs, or attempts’ to
commit the international crimes listed in the Charter.57 The Soviet
delegation fully supported the French draft and initially decided to
abstain from submitting its own proposal on this issue, explaining
that [w]e did not submit a text of our own, not only not to provoke a
fresh discussion, but in order to be able to come to an agreement
quickly’.58 Nevertheless, they eventually also handed in a proposal
that avoided any reference to conspiracy and stressed the acts of
54 Draft Article on Deﬁnition of ‘‘Crimes’’, Submitted by French Delegation, 19 July
1945, Document XXXV, in R. H. Jackson (n 46 above), 293 (emphasis added).
55 Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945, Document XXXVII, in ibid.,
301.
56 Amendments Proposed by the United Kingdom, 28 June 28 1945, Document XIV,
in ibid., 87.
57 Proposed Revision of Deﬁnition of ‘‘Crimes’’ (Article 6), Submission by the
British delegation, 20 July 1945, Document XXXIX, in ibid., 312.
58 Minutes of Conference Session of July 19,1945, Document XXXVII, in ibid.,
298.
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directing and participating in the preparation and execution of
international crimes.59
Jackson, however, was not ready to give in and accept a complete
exclusion of the notion of conspiracy from the IMT Charter. His
reaction to the above-described French proposal and the explanation
given by Professor Gros was to observe that it seemed to be em-
bodying our concept of conspiracy [but] my diﬃculty is that an
American judge would not be certain to recognize it in that dress’.60
Jackson expressed the view that Anglo-American and Continental
criminal law systems only had some technical diﬀerences’ on this
point that could be addressed by replacing the word conspiracy’ with
common plan’.61 It is unlikely that Jackson, having seen the proposal
of the French and of the British delegation, would have made such a
statement if he regarded the concept of conspiracy in the same
manner Bernays did. There is simply too much of a diﬀerence be-
tween what the British and French were proposing in the above-cited
drafts and Bernays’ plan. Indeed, when Jackson explained to the
other delegates his view on conspiracy, he did so in a way that –
contrary to Bernays’ memorandum – emphasized the accused’s
conduct and participation in the criminal plan as an essential pre-
requisite for ﬁnding him guilty of the concerted crime:
The American proposal is that we utilize the conspiracy theory by which a common
plan or understanding to accomplish an illegal end by any means, or to accomplish
any end by illegal means, renders everyone who participated liable for the acts of every
other.62
If taken on their face value, these statements rather indicate that
when Jackson advocated for the adoption of conspiracy responsi-
bility in the IMT Charter, he actually viewed it along the lines of the
general rules of complicity, as stated in the Yalta and the San
Francisco memorandums.63 He, thus, did not seem to share Bernays’
contention that by virtue of being a co-conspirator – i.e. by merely
59 Redraft of Deﬁnition of ‘‘Crimes’’, Submitted by Soviet Delegation, 23 July 1945,
Document XLIII, in ibid., 327.
60 Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945, Document XXXVII, in ibid.,
301.
61 Minutes of Conference Session of July 25, 1945, Document LI, in ibid., 387.
62 Minutes of Conference Session of July 2, 1945, Document XX, in ibid., 129
(emphasis added).
63 See text, notes 43–44 above.
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agreeing to the projected crimes – an individual can be held liable for
the crimes resulting from the execution of the said conspiracy. This is
an important conclusion because it tells us that the conspiracy–
complicity construct, as elaborated in Bernays’ original memoran-
dum, was in fact not really discussed at the London Conference.
The above analysis on Jackson’s take on conspiracy is conﬁrmed
by the manner in which he subsequently pled before the IMT the
responsibility of the senior Nazi accused for the crimes committed in
pursuance of the Hitlerite criminal plan. In particular, in his closing
address to the Tribunal, Jackson argued that each defendant played
a part which ﬁtted in with every other, and that all advanced the
common plan [to wage an aggressive war in Europe]’.64 He then
proceeded to describe the individual contribution of each accused to
this plan and concluded that:
The parts played by the other defendants, although less comprehensive and less
spectacular than that of [Go¨ring] were nevertheless integral and necessary contri-
butions to the joint undertaking, without any one of which the success of the
common enterprise would have been in jeopardy.65
As well as that:
Each of these men made a real contribution to the Nazi plan. Every man had a key
part. Deprive the Nazi regime of the functions performed by a Schacht, a Sauckel, a
von Papen, or a Goering, and you have a diﬀerent regime… Is there one [among the
accused] whose work did not substantially advance the conspiracy along its bloody
path towards its bloody goal?66
Thus, in contrast to Bernays’ conspiracy–complicity notion, Jackson
in fact viewed the accused’s coordinated contribution to the
advancement of the Hitlerite conspiracy as an essential ingredient for
imputing liability for the resulting crimes. In fact, a few years after
the Nuremberg Trial, this time sitting as a US Supreme Court judge
in the Krulewitch case, he explicitly denounced the underlying ratio-
nale of the Pinkerton theory (i.e. the manifestation of Bernays’ con-
spiracy in US law):
64 Oﬃce of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality,
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement A (Washington, D.C.: United States




A recent tendency has appeared in this Court to expand this elastic oﬀense and to
facilitate its proof. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, it sustained a con-
viction of a substantive crime where there was no proof of participation in or
knowledge of it, upon the novel and dubious theory that conspiracy is equivalent in
law to aiding and abetting.67
Although the above statements were made after the London Con-
ference, they constitute a reliable indicator that Jackson did not
follow Bernays’ vision of conspiracy when advocating for the adop-
tion of this notion in the IMT Charter. Like Bernays, he also saw the
Nazi plan to wage an aggressive war as an independent crime (viz. an
inchoate crime of conspiracy)68 but his views on the liability of the
Nazi leaders’ for the substantive crimes resulting from this conspiracy
were diﬀerent from Bernays’ and mirrored more closely those ex-
pressed in the Yalta memorandum. It is unfortunate that Jackson still
used the term conspiracy’ in the latter context but, as explained
further below, it is likely that he did this only to emphasize that the
act of agreeing to a crime is a crime in itself, rather than as an eﬀort
to establish that such an act alone can be the sole basis on which an
accused may be held responsible for the substantive crimes commit-
ted by others in the execution of the said conspiracy.
3.4 Article 6 IMT Charter and the Compromise on Conspiracy
Time was pressing the Allies at the London Conference and they
appeared to have reached an impasse on the conspiracy issue. Jack-
son was adamant that nothing except the common plan or conspir-
acy theory will reach’ certain top level Nazi war criminals,69 while the
head of the Soviet delegation, General Nikitchenko, openly disagreed
and stated that more traditional provisions on organizing and insti-
gating war crimes could serve to convict just as well.70 The frustration
from going back and forth to this debate and never reaching an
agreement was on the rise, a testimony of which is Nikitchenko’s
remark that [i]f we start discussion on that again, I am afraid the war
criminals will die of old age’.71 The compromise that Sir Maxwell
67 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), 451.
68 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement A (n 64 above), 17.
69 Minutes of Conference Session of July 16, 1945, Document XXX, in Jackson (n
46 above), 254.
70 Ibid.
71 Minutes of Conference Session of July 25, 1945, Document LI, in Jackson (n 46
above), 389.
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Fyfe, chairman of the London Conference, suggested and was
eventually accepted was to merge the proposals of the civil law Allies
with the American conspiracy text.72
By the end of the London Conference, the Allies had thus agreed
on the following text of Article 6 of the IMT Charter, deﬁning the
Tribunals’ jurisdiction:
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial
and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall
have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the Euro-
pean Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, com-
mitted any of the following crimes.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal for which, there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely; violations of the laws or customs of war. Such vio-
lations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages,
or devastation not justiﬁed by military necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
tion, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.
One can easily spot the patchwork of compromises that shape this article.
First of all, conspiracy as an inchoate oﬀence was recognised solely under
sub-paragraph (a): i.e. only when the criminal agreement is aimed at the
commission of crimes against peace. However, if the accused persons
formed an agreement to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity
under sub-paragraphs (b) or (c), the IMT Charter did not provide a basis
to charge and convict them for conspiracy, as an anticipatory crime. On
this point, Pomorski pointed out that [o]ne is at a loss to understand why
conspiracy to prepare an aggressive war should be a crime per se while
72 Ibid., 379.
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conspiracy to set up a death camp should not be’.73 It appears that this
adoption of conspiracy as an independent crime (only in relation to crimes
against peace) was the midway between not using it at all and using it for
all three categories of international crimes established under the Charter.
The very last sentence of Article 6 IMT Charter contained further
reference to the term conspiracy but this time in the context of the
rules of liability applicable to all the crimes listed in sub-paragraphs
(a) to (c). In the spirit of compromise, it was merged with the legal
notions that the Soviet and French delegations proposed at the
London Conference for ascribing liability to the Nazi leadership.74
Due to the lack of deﬁnition, however, it was unclear what the exact
limits and constituent elements of conspiracy liability were under this
provision. The phrase accomplices participating in the formulation
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy’ could at ﬁrst look be
interpreted as a codiﬁcation of Bernays’ conspiracy–complicity con-
struct (Pinkerton liability). Indeed, this view has often been expressed
in academia75 and the IMT’s restrictive interpretation of this par-
ticular provision, discussed further below, has thus been seen as an
explicit rejection of Bernays’ expansive concept of conspiracy and, by
analogy, of the modern-day JCE doctrine.76 In the author’s view,
however, neither the plain text, nor the travaux pre´paratoires of
Article 6 IMT Charter support such a conclusion. First of all, if the
said last sentence was intended to codify the expansive, bifurcated
construction of conspiracy as deﬁned in Bernays’ original memo-
randum, it would make no sense that Article 6(a) would then
explicitly, and in contrast to sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), state that
participating in a conspiracy to wage a war of aggression is a crime:
such a text would simply be redundant in light of the suggested
meaning of this article’s last sentence. More importantly, however, as
the above research demonstrated, none of the delegates at the Lon-
don Conference, not even Jackson, ever proposed that responsibility
for substantive oﬀences could be imputed on the sole basis of
agreeing to a common plan to commit them: i.e. this deﬁning feature
of Bernays’ conspiracy was not envisioned in the IMT Charter.77 To
73 S. Pomorski (n 31 above), 222.
74 See text, notes 54–59 above.
75 For scholars who have adopted such an interpretation, see e.g. A. Danner and J.
Martinez (n 3 above), 114–115; S. Pomorski (n 31 above), 223–224; H. Van Der Wilt
(n 23 above), 93–94; G. Fletcher (n 2 above), 14.
76 Prosecutor v. Ðord-evic´ (n 5 above), paras. 34–43.
77 See text, notes 54–68 above.
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be sure, Jackson did use the word conspiracy to also denote a form of
criminal participation, but he did so in a way consistent with the
traditional rules of complicity which require that the accused actively
participated in the criminal plan. Therefore, this author submits that
the better interpretation of the said last sentence of Article 6 is that it
used the word conspiracy’ merely as a synonym of common plan’ –
i.e. not as a distinct legal construct with its own speciﬁc meaning –
and, thus, that this provision codiﬁed the universally accepted rule of
joint liability, as formulated in the Yalta and in the San Francisco
memorandums.78 In this vein of thought, Jackson submitted in his
closing arguments in the IMT that:
The Charter forestalls resort to… parochial and narrow concepts of conspiracy taken
from local law by using the additional and non-technical term, common plan’.
Omitting entirely the alternative term of conspiracy’ the Charter reads that leaders,
organizes, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution
of a common plan to commit’ any of the described crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan’.79
As explained below, the Nuremberg Tribunal ultimately interpreted
the last sentence of Article 6 in this very manner: it omitted the
conspiracy language and found that this provision establishes the
separate and distinct concept of joint liability for those who mutually
participate in a criminal plan.
3.5 The IMT Judgment: Judicial Interpretation of Conspiracy
The Nuremberg Trial commenced on 20 November 1945 and the
Prosecution had indicted 24 senior military and political oﬃcials of Nazi
Germany,80 as well as the six most notorious Nazi organizations.81 The
charges were grouped in four counts which roughly followed the
structure of Article 6 IMT Charter: crimes against peace (Count Two),
78 See text, notes 43–44 above.
79 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement A (n 64 above), 30.
80 Two of the accused, however, were eventually not prosecuted: Robert Ley
(committed suicide a few days after being indicted) and Gustav Krupp (his health
condition rendered him unﬁt to stand trial). Therefore, in total 22 accused stood
trial, one of whom, Martin Bormann, was tried in absentia. Trial of the Major War
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945–
1 October 1946. Vol. I. Nuremberg, Germany, 1947, 27.
81 Ibid. The six indicted organizations were: the Reich Cabinet, the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, the Gestapo, the SA, and the General Staﬀ and
High Command of the German Armed Forces.
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war crimes (Count Three), crimes against humanity (Count Four) and
grand conspiracy to commit all the above (Count One).82
Pursuant to the agreed division of tasks amongst the Allies, the
Americans took charge of drafting Count One of the Indictment.83
The allegations of conspiracy guilt were thus formulated by none
other than Robert Jackson, who had already been appointed as Chief
U.S. Prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal. In doing so,
he and his team adopted a wide interpretation of the relevant text of
Article 6 IMT Charter. Notably, Count One alleged that the defen-
dants were guilty of conspiracy for the accomplishment of Crimes
against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity…
and of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes’.84 Thus, the defendants
were accused of three distinct counts of conspiracy as an inchoate
crime, which strongly suggests that the reason why Jackson was so
determined during the London Conference to have this term in the
last sentence of Article 6 IMT Charter was because he saw its
inclusion there as a statutory basis for charging the Nazi defendants
with the inchoate crime of conspiracy to commit each and every
category of crimes listed under the Charter.85 Aside from this, Count
One of the Indictment also alleged that, having participated in the
formulation or execution of the conspiracy to commit crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the defendants are
individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts committed
by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy’.86 While
one may be tempted to conclude that this presents Bernays’ concept
of conspiracy–complicity, such an assertion would be incorrect be-
cause Count One did not allege automatically that the accused in-
curred liability for the substantive oﬀences of the conspiracy on the
sole basis of being its members. Rather, it speciﬁcally referred to the
individual contributions of every accused to the execution of the
charged common plan or conspiracy,87 stated in detail in a separate
82 Ibid., 29–68.
83 S. Pomorski (n 31 above), 227; H. Leventhal et al., The Nuernberg Verdict’,
(1947) 60 Harvard Law Review 857, 859.
84 Oﬃce of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminal-
ity. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Oﬃce, 1946), 29.
85 G. Fletcher (n 2 above), 15.
86 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (n 84 above), 15.
87 Ibid., 29.
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appendix to the Indictment.88 Furthermore, as already explained
above, when Jackson addressed the IMT in his closing arguments, he
once again described the role of each defendant and emphasized that
they all made integral and necessary contributions to the joint
undertaking, without any of which the success of the common
enterprise would have been in jeopardy’.89 It is, thus, rather clear that
Bernays’ idea to hold the members of a conspiracy liable for its
substantive crimes solely by virtue of having agreed to it, was not pled
in the IMT Indictment.
Jackson’s formulation of the conspiracy charge, and particularly
the decision to charge all defendants with the inchoate crime of con-
spiracy to commit the crimes listed in the IMT Charter, faced an
onslaught during the judicial deliberations on Count One. The four
judges were divided on the concept conspiracy and two of them called
for its complete dismissal, while the other two favoured it.90 In this
deadlock situation, the solution that they crafted was to keep the
conspiracy charge but limit its scope and impact on the case, which is
why the part in the IMT Judgment that addresses this notion, titled
The Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy’, is just three pages
long and was used to convict only eight of the 24 accused individuals.91
The IMT judges made several important ﬁndings on conspiracy
law. To begin with, they found that Article 6(a) IMT Charter rec-
ognizes as a separate crime the formation of a conspiracy to commit
crimes against peace.92 The Tribunal did not clearly construe the legal
elements of this inchoate oﬀence93 but it clearly viewed the existence
88 Ibid., 57–68.
89 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement A (n 64 above), 25.
90 The French judge, Donnedieu de Vabres, and the US judge, Francis Biddle,
opposed the use of this concept, while the Soviet judge, Nikitchenko, and the British
judge, Lawrence, supported it. B. F. Smith (n 53 above), 121–123; S. Pomorski (n 31
above), 229–230.
91 Trial of the Major War Criminals (n 80 above), 224–226. The defendants who
were found guilty under Count One were Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, Keitel,
Rosenberg, Raeder, Jodl and Neurath. Ibid., 279–336.
92 Ibid., 226.
93 The judges did not explicitly deﬁne a legal framework for conspiracy but only
set certain limitations to it:
Conspiracy is not deﬁned in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the
conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not be too far
removed from the time of decision and of action. The planning, to be criminal, must
not rest merely on the declarations of a party program, such as are found in the 25
points of the Nazi Party, announced in 1920, or the political aﬃrmations expressed
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of an agreement to wage an aggressive war as the key component of
this construct. In particular, to establish this charge, the judges re-
quired evidence of speciﬁc meetings between Hitler and his closes
aides, in which the invasion of other European countries was dis-
cussed and arranged. 94 Conspiracy guilt was then reserved for those
few accused who attended these meetings and who with knowledge
of [Hitler’s] aims, gave him their co-operation’.95 From this point
onwards, however, the Prosecution’s case under Count One of the
Indictment hit a dead end. Crucially, the IMT rejected in toto the
charges on conspiracy to commit war crimes and conspiracy to
commit crimes against humanity.96 Thus, it conﬁrmed that while
agreeing with other persons to wage a war of aggression is an
international crime, agreeing with others to commit war crimes, or
crimes against humanity, is not an act that in itself could be deﬁned as
criminal. In reaching this conclusion, the judges found that the
additional reference to the term conspiracy in the very last sentence of
Article 6 IMT Charter [does] not add a new and separate crime to
those already listed [but is] designed to establish the responsibility of
persons participating in a common plan’.97 They thus rejected the
assertion that the latter provision oﬀers a legal basis to also charge
the defendants with conspiracy to commit war crimes and conspiracy
to commit crimes against humanity. Rather, the IMT judges inter-
preted the problematic notion of participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy’ strictly as a mode of
liability that is separate and distinct from the concept of conspiracy.
Those who subscribe to the view that the last sentence of Article 6
IMT Charter codiﬁed Bernays’ conspiracy–complicity concept, con-
sider this latter ﬁnding of the IMT to be a rejection of the expansive
use of conspiracy and, by analogy, of the modern JCE doctrine.98
Footnote 93 continued
inMein Kampf in later years. The Tribunal must examine whether a concrete plan to
wage war existed, and determine the participants in that concrete plan. (Ibid., 225).
94 An example is the 5 November 1937 meeting in Berlin which was attended by
Hitler’s Supreme Commanders and discussed the invasion of Austria and Cze-
choslovakia – plans that materialized just a few months later. Ibid., 865–867.
95 Ibid., 226. See also S. Pomorski (n 31 above), 233.
96 Trial of the Major War Criminals (n 80 above), 226.
97 Ibid.
98 Prosecutor v. Ðord-evic´ (n 5 above), paras. 34–45. See also e.g. M. Osiel, The
Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity’, (2005) 105 Columbia
Law Review 1751, 1791–1794.
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This assertion forms the crux of the problem examined in the present
article and should be carefully considered here. First of all, as was
already pointed out above, neither Article 6 IMT Charter, nor Count
One of the Indictment, actually contained the particular construction
of conspiracy that Bernays ﬁrst proposed in his original memoran-
dum.99 Therefore, since this distinct construct was not squarely put
before the IMT, it is rather inaccurate to consider that the Tribunal
speciﬁcally rejected it. Be that as it may, the judges’ restrictive
interpretation of the scope and meaning of conspiracy could still be
constructively viewed as an implicit rejection of the underlying ra-
tionale behind Bernays’ conspiracy–complicity (Pinkerton conspir-
acy). To be sure, the idea that the sole act of agreeing to a criminal
plan makes one responsible for all acts committed by any persons in
the execution of such plan or conspiracy’ was not endorsed in the
IMT Judgment. Notably, none of the accused who were found guilty
under the aggressive war conspiracy charge was also automatically
found liable for the substantive crimes that resulted from the exe-
cution of this conspiracy. Indeed, for a conviction under Counts Two
to Four of the Indictment, the judges always required evidence of the
accused’s active participation in the furtherance of the conspiracy,
leading to the commission of the alleged substantive crime. An
apposite example is the conviction of Rudolf Hess, who was charged
under all four counts in the Indictment. The IMT held that Hess was
the top man in the Nazi Party’ and that as the Deputy Fuehrer he was
privy to Hitler’s secret plans to wage a war of aggression in Eur-
ope.100 His knowing acceptance of these designs made him guilty of
the charge of conspiracy under Count One. Subsequently, Hess was
also convicted under Count Two for the substantive crime of waging
a war of aggression (crimes against peace), but only after the judges
cited evidence of his participation in the furtherance of Hitler’s
99 See text, notes 74–79 and 83–89 above.
100 The evidence did not directly establish that Hess attended the several confer-
ences where Hitler discussed with his closest henchmen the plans to wage an
aggressive war, but the Tribunal held: ‘‘Hess was Hitler’s closest personal conﬁdant.
Their relationship was such that Hess must have been informed of Hitler’s aggressive
plans when they came into existence’’. Trial of the Major War Criminals (n 80
above), 284.
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plan.101 Crucially, however, Hess was found not guilty of Counts Two
and Three of the Indictment because the IMT [did] not ﬁnd that the
evidence suﬃciently connects Hess with these crimes to sustain a
ﬁnding of guilt’.102 If the Tribunal had followed Bernays’ conspiracy–
complicity notion, Hess would undoubtedly have been found guilty
of the war crimes and crimes against humanity that resulted from the
execution of the Hitlerite grand conspiracy, since he was a member in
it/he had agreed to the plan to wage an aggressive war in Europe.103
The IMT judges did not adopt this approach and their restrictive
reasoning could rightly be regarded as an implicit rejection of Ber-
nays’ expansive formulation of conspiracy. The question thus arises:
what impact does this ﬁnding have on the application of the JCE
doctrine in contemporary international criminal proceedings?
IV DISTINGUISHING NUREMBERG’S CONSPIRACY
FROM THE UN AD HOC TRIBUNALS’ JCE
DOCTRINE
As pointed out at the beginning of this article, since the passing of the
IMT Judgment the concept of conspiracy has been, by and large,
jettisoned from the ﬁeld of international criminal law, which in turn
has often prompted critics of the JCE theory to draw parallels be-
tween these two notions and argue that their fate ought to be the
same. The UN ad hoc Tribunals’ response to this line of reasoning has
been to maintain that JCE and conspiracy are inherently diﬀerent
concepts because the former is a mode of liability and the latter is a
substantive crime: a conclusion that has proven to be rather uncon-
vincing, seeing that it has not quelled the controversy. The main
diﬃculty with the ICTY/R’s reasoning on this point has been that it
does not properly appreciate the crux of the argument that JCE
opponents have put forward: namely, that Nuremberg law (viz.
Bernays’ plan and Article 6 IMT Charter) deﬁned conspiracy broadly
101 The judges held that Hess was ‘‘informed of Hitler’s aggressive plans when they
came into existence [and] he took action to carry out these plans whenever action was
necessary’’. To mention a few examples of Hess’s participation in the execution of
the aggressive war plan, the judges stated that he ‘‘signed a decree setting up the
government of Sudetenland as an integral part of the Reich,’’ or that he ‘‘arranged
with Keitel to carry out the instructions of Hitler to make the machinery of the Nazi
Party available for a secret mobilization,’’ etc. Ibid., 283, 285.
102 Ibid., 284.
103 On this point, see also G. Fletcher (n 2 above), 15, 20.
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and identically to what we nowadays call JCE liability. The argument
then goes, as seen most recently in the ICTY Ðord-evic´ case, that the
IMT’s ultimate rejection of such a sweeping formulation of con-
spiracy liability must be regarded as a rejection of the modern JCE
theory.104 The above research can help us to understand why the
relationship between the notions of JCE and conspiracy has contin-
ued to be such a divisive issue among scholars and practitioners in
this ﬁeld of law. More importantly, however, it provides us with enough
information to reassess the ICTY/R’s conclusions on this matter.
The present divergence of opinions could be largely explained by
the fact that the concept of conspiracy did not have a single, con-
sistent legal deﬁnition in the post-World War II context. Instead, its
scope and nature were deﬁned diﬀerently from the moment of its ﬁrst
formulation in Bernays’ original memorandum to the point of its
application in the IMT Judgment. Being such a multifaceted concept,
it can be rather complicated to compare it to the JCE theory and
when the ICTY Ojdanic´ Appeals Chamber ﬁrst did so its analysis
turned out to be somewhat incomplete. To be sure, the judges were
right to stress that the nature of conspiracy as a substantive crime in
its own right makes it materially distinct from JCE responsibility.
Indeed, the IMT Judgment did ultimately deﬁne the former concept
strictly as an inchoate oﬀence and distinguished it from the modes of
liability listed in Article 6 IMT Charter.105 In fact, one could even
distil an evolutionary pattern in the Nuremberg law on conspiracy,
where this concept was initially deﬁned excessively broadly in Ber-
nays’ original memorandum and was then gradually reﬁned in the
above-identiﬁed subsequent stages, until it was eventually adopted by
the Nuremberg Tribunal only in its form as a crime. This conclusion,
however, raises another fundamental question that the ad hoc Tri-
bunals have overlooked: if the sweeping use of conspiracy that was
ﬁrst suggested by Bernays (and was subsequently also introduced in
US domestic criminal law in the Pinkerton case) was rejected by the
IMT, does this also mean that the IMT Judgment practically de-
nounced the legal framework of the modern JCE doctrine? This is
where the analysis of the ICTY Ojdanic´ Appeals Chamber comes
short and where the persisting controversy on this topic stems from.
Those who subscribe to the view that JCE is simply a byword for
conspiracy do not refer to conspiracy proper (i.e. the inchoate crime),
but to Bernays’ conspiracy–complicity construct/the US Pinkerton
104 Prosecutor v. Ðord-evic´ (n 5 above), paras. 41, 43, 45.
105 See text, notes 92–103 above.
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theory.106 If a sign of equality could, indeed, be put between these
two notions, then it would truly be logical to infer, as the Ðord-evic´
Defence did, that the IMT’s rejection of such expansive use of con-
spiracy responsibility should be viewed as an ipso facto rejection of
the JCE doctrine.107
In this author’s view, the IMT’s (implicit) refusal to apply the notion
of conspiracy in the manner envisioned in Bernays’ memorandum can
have no bearing on the application of the JCE doctrine in modern
international criminal law because, contrary to what has often been
suggested in academia, Bernays’/Pinkerton conspiracy and JCE are still
two materially distinct notions. As the above review of Bernays’ mem-
orandum has revealed, the former provided that a person who agreed
with others to commit a crime could be held liable for the crime of
conspiracy and for the actual product crimes of that agreement, irre-
spective of whether he participated in their execution or not.108 This
feature of Bernays’ version of conspiracy was distinguished and criticised
already by his contemporaries109 and has, indeed, also been highlighted
in the US Pinkerton doctrine. To cite Fichtelberg on this point:
[T]he dramatic legal consequences of conspiracy become highlighted even further in
light of the Pinkerton rule, that asserts that an individual may be prosecuted for a
crime that he or she played no role in carrying out, provided that it can be shown that
the criminal act was part of the actual conspiracy… This means that an individual
who is part of a conspiracy may be charged with all of the crimes that comprise the
conspiratorial enterprise without actually proving that the accused had anything to do
with the carrying out of the actual crime itself.110
This aspect marks the ﬁrst crucial diﬀerence with the JCE theory which
always requires that the accused either directly participated in the
commission of the collective crime or that he otherwise contributed to
106 See e.g. H. Van Der Wilt, System Criminality (n 3 above), 164; J. Ohlin (n 21
above), 702–703; A. Danner and J. Martinez (n 3 above), 117, 119; H. Van Der Wilt
(n 23 above), 96.
107 Prosecutor v. Ðord-evic´ (n 5 above), paras. 34–43.
108 See text, notes 27–29, 36–38 above.
109 See text, notes 39–45 above.
110 A. Fichtelberg, Conspiracy and International Criminal Justice’, (2006) 17
Criminal Law Forum 149, 156 (emphasis added). See also e.g. E. Van Sliedregt (n 31
above), 132. This same observation was also made by Justice Jackson in his separate
opinion to the Krulewitch v. United States (n 67 above).
A JANUS-FACED CONCEPT 449
the furtherance of the common design.111 The ICTY/R has further
emphasized that although the accused’s contribution need not be sine
qua non for the successful execution of the JCE, it should at least be a
signiﬁcant contribution to the crimes for which the accused is to be
found responsible’.112 Even the most far-reaching variant of this theory,
i.e. JCE III liability, still requires proof that the accused signiﬁcantly
contributed to the original common design before he can be held guilty
of the deviatory crimes.113 A JCE member who agrees to the common
plan but subsequently does nothing to contribute to it cannot, under any
of the doctrine’s variants, be held liable for the crimes that resulted from
the execution of the plan. In fact, he cannot be held liable even if it could
be established that he provided some minimal assistance to the common
purpose. By contrast, Pinkerton/Bernays’ conspiracy puts forward only
one objective inquiry for imputing liability for the substantive crimes of
a conspiracy: viz. it only asks whether the accused agreed to the crimi-
nal.114 The question whether he actually contributed to/participated in
the furtherance of the conspiracy through any positive acts or omissions
is, as Bernays argued, legally irrelevant. This distinction between the two
notions cannot be overemphasized, it marks a crucial diﬀerence between
them and a major point of doctrinal criticism against Bernays’/Pinkerton
conspiracy. To be sure, there exists some uncertainty as to whether JCE
responsibility requires that the accused contributed at the execution
stage of the common plan or whether signiﬁcant contributions at the
preparatory stage of the JCE could suﬃce to hold him liable under this
doctrine.115 Nonetheless, even if the latter is true, this would not detract
111 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (n 6 above), para. 227; Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka et al. (n 9
above), paras. 96, 99.
112 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Brd-anin (n 8 above), paras. 430; Prosecutor v Martic´,
(Appeal Judgment) IT-95-11-A (8 October 2008), para. 172; Gatete v Prosecutor (n
20 above), para. 96; Ndahimana v Prosecutor, (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-01-68-A (16
December 2013), para. 199, n. 526. See also A. Cassese (n 19 above), 163.
113 Ngirabatware v Prosecutor (MICT-12-29-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 18
December 2014, para. 251. As explained above, the actus reus of the three JCE
categories is the same: i.e. they all require that the accused contributes to the com-
mon purpose. See n 8 above.
114 See text, notes 29, 36–38 above.
115 This issue was recently raised in the ICTY Kanyarukiga case, where the Trial
Chamber found that the Accused only participated in the planning of the destruction
of a church, and no evidence that he contributed in any way to the actual attack on
the church. According to the Trial Chamber, this kind of assistance was insuﬃcient
to constitute a contribution within the meaning of JCE’s participation requirement.
To this end, the Trial Chamber referred to a number of ICTY and ICTR appeals
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from the above ﬁnding because in either case the JCE doctrine requires
that the accused signiﬁcantly contributes to the common purpose: i.e.
mere acquiescence to it without any subsequent contribution to the
preparation and/or execution of the said plan is not enough to incur
JCE liability. To give an example, if the leader of state A devises a plan
to invade state B, gathers his generals in a secret meeting to reveal to
them this plan and to assign to them various task for the successful
completion of the plan, each general who agrees to that plan becomes
liable of conspiring to commit a crime against peace and, pursuant to
Bernays’ sweeping notion of conspiracy, of the substantive crimes
committed in the execution of the said conspiracy.116 Under the JCE
theory, the said general cannot be held liable of anything unless the
Prosecution can prove inter alia that he signiﬁcantly contributed to the
common purpose through acts or omissions carried out either in
preparation (e.g. mobilizing forces, acquiring weapons) or in execution
(e.g. ordering and coordinating the invasion of state B) of the said plan.
As August von Knieriem observed, merely agreeing/acquiescing to the
plan could qualify as neither of these forms of contribution,117 yet it is
enough to trigger the notion of conspiracy.
A second fundamental distinction between Bernays’ expansive
formulation of conspiracy and the JCE doctrine lies in the fact that
the former is still in part an inchoate crime: i.e. pursuant to it, a
person who joins a criminal agreement is held guilty of the very act of
agreeing to commit a crime.118 As explained in detail above, this
Footnote 115 continued
judgment which contain language to the eﬀect that, under the JCE doctrine, the
accused’s contribution need not involve the commission of a speciﬁc crime but may
also take the form of any other assistance to the execution of the common plan. See
Prosecutor v Kanyarukiga, (Trial Judgment) ICTR-2002-78-T (1 November 2010),
para. 643. The Prosecution appealed this ﬁnding of law, submitting before the ICTR
Appeals Chamber that it does not seek to invalidate the trial judgement on this point,
put requested a clariﬁcation on an issue of law that is of general importance for the
JCE jurisprudence. The Appeals Chamber took notice of this ground of appeal but,
interestingly, refused to pronounce on the issue. Kanyarukiga v. Prosecutor (Appeal
Judgment), ICTR 02-78-A (8 May 2012), paras. 264–268. Writing in a separate
opinion to this appeal judgment, Judge Pocar observed that ‘‘the [ICTY/R]
jurisprudence does not specify what form the participation of an accused in the
common purpose of a joint criminal enterprise must take.’’ Ibid., (Separate Opinion
of Judge Pocar), para. 4.
116 See Section III, 3.1. and 3.2 above.
117 See text, note 42 above.
118 See text, notes 27–28, 36–37 above.
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notion thus has a distinctly bifurcated nature since it can be used to
hold a person who joins a criminal agreement: (i) guilty of the crime
of agreeing to the commit a crime (an idea that is largely foreign to
Continental European law);119 and (ii) liable for the subsequent
commission of any substantive crimes by his confederates in pur-
suance of that agreement. The JCE doctrine, on the other hand, lacks
the entire ﬁrst limb of Bernays’/Pinkerton conspiracy: i.e. one who
agrees to a JCE aiming at, or involving, the commission of crimes is
not guilty of anything.120 In other words, joining/becoming a member
of a JCE is not an act that this doctrine deﬁnes as a crime in its own
right.
In view of the above diﬀerences, it becomes quite evident that if
Bernays’ conspiracy and the JCE doctrine can be said to share any
common feature, it is that both constructs deal with the criminal
responsibility of persons sharing a common plan to commit a crime: a
similarity that, on its own, makes Bernays’ legal notion as akin to
joint criminal enterprise responsibility, as it is to any other theory of
co-perpetration. Be that as it may, this author is convinced that the
two major diﬀerences discussed above suﬃciently show that the JCE
doctrine is materially diﬀerent from Bernays’/Pinkerton conspiracy.
Therefore, the argument that the latter was ultimately denounced by
the Nuremberg Tribunal cannot be used to challenge the legal basis
for applying JCE liability in modern international criminal pro-
ceedings. In fact, if anything, the IMT Judgment can be cited as early
jurisprudential support of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine since
it ﬁrst nuanced the conspiracy notion from what the judges called
participating in a common plan’ liability.121 This particular ﬁnding
of the Nuremberg Tribunal was subsequently elaborated in the trials
of lesser’ Nazi war criminals, conducted under the authority of
Control Council Law No. 10. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst three cases
brought before the US Military Tribunals in Nuremberg – i.e. the
Medical, Justice and Pohl cases – the Prosecution charged the accused
119 See e.g. G. Fletcher (n 2 above), 9. See also n 31 above. It should be noted,
however, that civil law jurisdictions have gradually also come to endorse in their
legislation notions that in some aspects resemble the common law concept of con-
spiracy. For a detailed research on German, French, Spanish and Italian legislation
and case law on such similar legal constructs, see J. Okoth, The Crime of Conspiracy
in International Criminal Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 46–73.
120 Such a person becomes responsible only when the JCE is executed and only
provided that he contributed to the common purpose. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´ et al.
(Decision on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction) (n 14 above), para. 23.
121 See text, note 97 above.
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with a count, titled The Common Design or Conspiracy’, which in
each of these cases read:
[A]ll of the defendants herein, acting pursuant to a common design, unlawfully,
willfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree together and with each other and
with divers other persons, to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as
deﬁned in Control Council Law No. 10, Article II.122
And then continued on to say that all the accused were individually
responsible for their own acts and for all acts performed by any
person or persons in execution of the said common design, conspir-
acy, plans, and enterprises’.123 The judges reiterated the ﬁndings of
the IMT and held that:
It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal nor Control Council Law No. 10 has deﬁned conspiracy to commit a war
crime or crime against humanity as a separate substantive crime; therefore, this
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any defendant upon a charge of conspiracy
considered as a separate substantive oﬀense.
Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge of conspiracy, also alleges
unlawful participation in the formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes
and crimes against humanity which actually involved the commission of such crimes.
We, therefore, cannot properly strike the whole of Count I from the indictment, but
insofar as Count I charges the commission of the alleged crime of conspiracy as a
separate substantive oﬀense, distinct from any war crime or crime against humanity,
the Tribunal will disregard that charge.124
This ruling in the Medical case clearly conﬁrms the earlier ﬁnding of
the IMT that the concept of conspiracy under international criminal
law is: (i) strictly a substantive crime and only in relation to crimes
against peace; and (ii) diﬀerent from the notion of common design
liability’, which is a separate form of liability applicable in cases of
participation in the formulation and execution of plans’ to commit
international crimes and which nowadays is cited as the jurispru-
122 Military Tribunal I, United States of America v. Karl Brandt et al. (‘‘The
Medical Case’’), Case No. 1 (9 December 1946–19 August 1947), in: Trials of War
Criminals (n 41 above), Vol. I (1949), 10; Military Tribunal III, United States of
America v. Josef Altsto¨tter et al. (‘‘The Justice Case’’), Case No. 3 (5 March 1947–4
December 1947) in: ibid., Vol. III (1951), 17; Military Tribunal II, United States of
America v. Oswald Pohl et al. (‘‘The Pohl Case), Case No. 4 (8 April 1947–3
November 1947) in: ibid., Vol. V (1950), 201.
123 Ibid.
124 The Medical Case (n 122 above), 122.
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dential ancestor of the JCE doctrine.125 This line of reasoning was
also echoed in legal scholarship during the ﬁrst years after the
Nuremberg-era trials.126
V CONCLUSION
If the post-World War II legislation and case law on the notion of
conspiracy can be described in a few words, controversial’, confus-
ing’ and complex’ would likely top the list. This article has shown
that at diﬀerent times, diﬀerent actors oﬀered diﬀerent interpreta-
tions of the meaning and nature of this legal concept. As a result of
this chaotic legacy, nowadays, both those who contend that con-
spiracy is solely a substantive crime and those who argue that it is
also a form of criminal participation can review the Nuremberg-era
documents that evince the birth of this concept under international
criminal law and ﬁnd support for their respective view. Indeed, this
kind of reviews have permeated the present-day debates on the
relationship between the notion of conspiracy and the JCE doctrine.
One argument that has continued to resonate among scholars and
practitioners, and that has been left largely unaddressed by the
ICTY/R, is that when the International Military Tribunal ultimately
restricted the scope of conspiracy, it in fact rejected the excessive use
of this notion originally envisioned in Bernays’ memorandum and
subsequently propounded in Article 6 IMT Charter. By equating
Bernays’ conspiracy to JCE, it has thus been argued that the Judg-
125 Prosecutor v. Brd-anin (n 8 above), paras. 393, 399–404; Rwamakuba v.
Prosecutor, (Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint
Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide) ICTR-98-44-AR72.4 (22 October
2004), paras. 15–23; Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan,
(Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint
Criminal Enterprise (JCE)) 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (20 May 2010), paras. 65–
68.
126 M. Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe’, (1950–1951) 39 The
Georgetown Law Journal 18, 82. Koessler, who was an attorney of the US Depart-
ment of the Army in the war crimes trials in occupied Germany, wrote that: Con-
cerning forms of participation in a crime, charges in the Dachau trials were at least
on their face based upon the general principles regarding kinds of complicity rec-
ognized among all civilized nations rather than on anything which is particular to the
Anglo-American systems of law, as for instance, charged based merely on an
agreement to commit a crime, without any materialization thereof, at least in the
form of an attempt (conspiracy). No exception from this general approach were the
so-called common design charges which must not be confused with a conspiracy
charge even though they were often loosely referred to by the last mentioned term.’
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ment of the Nuremberg Tribunal practically denounces the underly-
ing rationale of the latter doctrine: a contention that detracts from
the customary basis for applying it in modern international criminal
law.
This article has sought to establish a comprehensive account of the
legislative origins and development of the conspiracy notion in post-
World War II law, in order to understand its actual legal meaning,
examine its reﬁnement and use in the Nuremberg process and, ulti-
mately, address the above-stated contention. In doing so, the research
has distinguished three evolutionary stages in the construction of
conspiracy under international criminal law: (i) Bernays’ memoran-
dum and the US interdepartmental debates on it; (ii) the London
Conference and the preparatory works of Article 6 IMT Charter; and
(iii) the IMT Judgment (and the subsequent Nazi trials). It was shown
that this notion was deﬁned excessively broadly in Bernays’ prose-
cutorial plan which formulated it both as a substantive crime and as a
mode of liability. Almost immediately, however, this two-faced
construct was criticised by some of Bernays’ contemporaries, and
most notably by Herbert Wechsler, who recognized that it breached
the basic rules of accomplice liability. This initiated a process of
review which sought to bring Bernays’ proposal in better conformity
with the general principles of law, recognised by all civilised nations.
The crucial diﬀerences between conspiracy and the underlying prin-
ciples of the contemporary JCE concept were highlighted already in
those days and it is astonishing that 70 years later the relationship
between the two notions continues to cause confusion. Importantly,
by the time conspiracy liability reached the Nuremberg Tribunal, it
had undergone a gradual process of reﬁnement which narrowed
down Bernays’ original vision of the scope and nature of this concept.
Contrary to what has often been said in academia, the above research
has argued that it is unlikely that Article 6 IMT Charter at all pro-
pounded the bifurcated nature of conspiracy from Bernays’ memo-
randum. In any event, the IMT Judgment, and later the Nazi trials
conducted under Control Council Law No. 10, ultimately deﬁned this
concept strictly as an inchoate crime and strongly distinguished it
from the distinct mode of liability they referred to as participation in
the furtherance of a common plan/design. Inasmuch as this presents a
ﬁnal determination on the legal scope/nature of conspiracy under
international criminal law, the ICTY Ojdanic´ Appeals Chamber
rightly concluded that conspiracy and JCE are two inherently distinct
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constructs and the exclusion of the former from modern international
criminal law could have no bearing on basis for applying the latter.
The above conclusion, however, does not address the distinct and
more subtle question of whether the IMT’s narrow interpretation of
conspiracy, and ipso facto rejection of Bernays’ wide formulation of
this notion, also constitutes a rejection of the modern-day JCE the-
ory. This article has submitted that such an assertion lacks in merit
because even if one compares Bernays’ notion of conspiracy–com-
plicity – known in US criminal law as Pinkerton conspiracy – to the
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, it is still impossible to put a sign
of equality between them. Crucially, it was ﬁrst explained that, unlike
Bernays’ conspiracy concept, JCE is never an independent crime: i.e.
a JCE member who shares with other individuals a yet-unexecuted
common plan, purpose or design to commit a crime is not guilty of
anything. Perhaps even more fundamentally, JCE could never be
used, under any of its three variants, to impute liability to an accused
who solely agreed to a criminal purpose without contributing in any
way to its furtherance. This marks an important diﬀerence from
Bernays’/Pinkerton conspiracy which allows holding the accused
responsible for the substantive crimes of the conspiracy on the sole
basis that he agreed to them and irrespective of whether he partici-
pated, through any act or omission, in their execution. It is, thus,
concluded that the IMT’s implicit rejection of the sweeping use of
conspiracy that was originally deﬁned in Bernays’ plan, could not be
regarded as a rejection of the underlying rationale of the JCE theory
because these two constructs are materially distinct.
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